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1. Introduction 
The European Union is committed to limiting the rise in global average temperature to 
2°C above pre-industrial levels (CEC 2008). It has set ambitious targets for greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction. At the same time, the EU has adopted equally ambitious targets 
for the portfolio for energy supply. The EU aims to meet these targets through a range of 
policy instruments at the Union, Member State and even subnational level. (Tinbergen 
1952) cautioned policy makers over the welfare losses that are likely if the number of 
instruments and targets do not match. This paper provides some estimates of the size of 
such welfare losses and some insights into the mechanisms behind the inefficiencies. 
Roughly, the EU has set the following targets: Greenhouse gas emissions should be 
reduced to 20% below their 1990 levels by 2020. About half of these emissions – 
essentially all energy-intensive industries1 – are to be regulated under the European 
Trading Scheme (ETS). The target is -21% below 2005 levels. 
The EU ETS is the first large-scale, international market for emissions permits (Convery 
2009;Convery and Redmond 2007;Ellerman and Buchner 2007). It is a landmark 
environmental policy. The rationale of emissions trading is straightforward: The direct 
costs of meeting an exogenous emissions constraint (cap) would be minimized if all the 
emitters covered by the cap faced the same marginal abatement costs. In this case, there 
is no arbitrage in trading abatement efforts across emitters. Within a cap-and-trade 
system, cost-minimizing behaviour by individual emitters leads to a single price. 
Decentralized market interactions of economic agents assure the collective least-cost 
attainment of the system’s emissions constraint. 
The other half of greenhouse gas emissions are currently unregulated at the EU level, but 
subject to emissions control measures by individual Member States. The average target is 
-10%, but Member State targets range from a 20% decrease to a 20% increase relative to 
                                                 
1 The petrochemical, aluminium, and aviation industries will be included from 2012 onwards. 
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2005; the average target is -18% relative to 1990. Achieving these targets is left to the 
Member States, but these are allowed to trade their non-ETS allocations among one 
another (Tol 2009b). Three percent emissions reduction may be achieved by investing in 
CDM-like projects in developing countries. The 3% limit is applied at the Member State 
level, but the access rights (CDM warrants) are again tradable among governments 
(Gorecki et al. 2009). 
Although the four markets (ETS, non-ETS, CDM, CDM warrants) could jointly lead to a 
uniform price for all greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union, this is not 
guaranteed as it would be by a comprehensive market (Tol 2009a). Besides, the non-ETS 
and CDM warrant markets are untested, while the CDM market is less than perfect 
(Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005). Cost-effectiveness at the EU level would require cost-
effective implementation of non-ETS emissions reduction at the Member State level (see 
below). The costs of meeting the EU emissions target raise a further concern. 
The second headline target is a 20% penetration of renewable energy by 2020. There are 
targets for every Member State, but these obligations are also tradable (Bertoldi and Huld 
2006). Some of the Member States have adopted separate targets on the penetration of 
renewable energy in specific markets, such as transport and residential heating. 
There is also an EU-wide aspiration to improve energy efficiency by at least 20% 
between 2005 and 2020, and perhaps there will be a market for this too (Oikonomou et al. 
2008). 
From the perspective of climate policy, these additional targets create excess cost. If 
targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency become binding, they produce an 
outcome different from the cost-effective solution generated by comprehensive emissions 
trading. This implies additional costs (Boehringer et al. 2008). The relative contribution 
of renewables and energy efficiency to emissions reduction should be determined by the 
markets and not by bureaucrats.2 
Besides the various markets that operate at EU level, there are other instruments as well. 
Chief among these is the fuel efficiency target for passenger cars (European Parliament 
                                                 
2 Admittedly, there could be other objectives behind renewable energy quotas and energy efficiency targets. 
But  here too these are imperfect proxies for energy security or strategic technological innovation. 
 3
and Council of the European Union 2009), although one could also argue that this is a 
bilinear tax. Symbolically, incandescent light bulbs will be banned (Ecodesign 
Regulatory Committee 2008). The European Parliament has also considered other 
options, including banning patio heaters (European Parliament 2008) and the abolishment 
of daylight saving time (Doyle 2009). The EU has 27 Member States, and many of these 
have a wide variety of additional measures, including carbon taxes, appliance subsidies, 
tax breaks for bicycle owners, standards for tyre pressure, tests for efficient driving, and 
many others. At the same time, a number of Member States continue to support fossil 
fuels, car transport, agriculture, and other activities that emit disproportionate amounts of 
greenhouse gases. 
Against this background, the primary objective of the EMF22 model analysis on EU 
climate policies is to provide quantitative estimates of the potential excess costs from 
restricted trading and overlapping regulation. The economic models used in this study 
cannot possibly reflect the true complexity of climate and energy policy in the European 
Union. Instead, we designed a set of stylized scenarios that (1) highlight the main 
inefficiencies and (2) attribute these to the various elements of the regulation. 
The three models included in this analysis are multi-regional, multi-sector general 
equilibrium models. A key advantage of these models is that they provide a 
comprehensive representation of price-dependent market interactions based on 
microeconomic theory. The simultaneous explanation of the origin and spending of 
agents’ incomes makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as 
distributional impacts of policy interference. Policy measures in open economies can 
influence both domestic markets and international prices via changes in exports and 
imports. The changes in international prices, i.e., the terms of trade, imply secondary 
effects which can significantly affect the welfare impacts of the primary domestic policy. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the study design. Section 3 discusses the 
shared results of the three models included in the study. Section 4 reviews the additional 
results from the individual papers. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Study design 
To a first approximation, the costs of emissions reduction are determined by two factors 
(Weyant 1993): the distance to the target and steepness of the abatement cost curve.3 
Costs increase as the cost curve steepens, or as the difference grows between emissions 
with policy and emissions without policy grows. The EU target for 2020 is set relative to 
1990 emissions. The distance to target is thus given by the growth rate of emissions in the 
absence of additional policy. This is therefore an important variable in any model 
comparison. 
In a textbook analysis, climate policy is least cost if all emitters face the same marginal 
costs. Some departures from this paradigm are possible when second-best effects are at 
work (Babiker et al. 2003;Baumol and Bradford 1970;Goulder et al. 1997;Parry et al. 
1999;Parry 2000), but it makes sense to begin with a model in which excess costs of 
suboptimal policy are determined by the differentials in marginal costs. The gains from 
trade (in emissions permits) are larger if there are greater opportunities for arbitrage, that 
is, if the price differences before trade are larger (Montgomery 1972). Differences in 
marginal abatement costs between and within sectors, and between and within countries 
would occur if the targets set are incommensurate with cost curves and growth rates. This 
is likely in the European Union, as relatively uniform emissions reduction obligations 
were imposed on sectors and countries with very different dynamics. Again, a model 
comparison should consider differences in the baseline. Furthermore, it is important to 
consider the sectoral and regional resolution, as models typically assume homogeneity 
within the sectors and regions. A highly aggregate model thus has fewer options for 
arbitrage and hence lower gains from a uniform carbon price. 
EU climate policy combines targets for emissions with targets for renewables. Compared 
with a policy on emissions only, this has two implications. First, the additional target is a 
supplementary constraint, and this can only increase total costs. Second, as the 
renewables target reduces greenhouse gas emissions, the incentive needed to meet the 
                                                 
3 The costs of emissions reduction are moderated by three complications. First, climate policy may interact 
with other policies. Second, the revenues of climate policy may be used to alter prior distortions. Third, 
implementation of climate policy would change the competitive position of the economy. 
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emissions target is lower. That is, the renewables target raises the total costs of policy, 
but reduces the price of carbon. 
Using these priors, we designed the following scenarios: 
1. No additional policy 
2. 20% emissions reduction 
a. Uniform carbon price 
b. Uniform carbon price in ETS and non-ETS 
c. Uniform carbon price in ETS; non-ETS carbon prices vary by Member 
State4 
3. 20% emissions reduction and a lower bound of 20% on renewables penetration 
a. Uniform carbon price 
b. Uniform carbon price in ETS and non-ETS 
c. Uniform carbon price in ETS; non-ETS carbon prices vary by Member 
State5 
 
3. Common results 
We first consider the first best policy, with a uniform price of carbon for all sources and 
countries. Figure 1 shows the EU-wide emissions reduction target of ETS and non-ETS 
emissions according to the three models. The nominal targets (relative to the base year) 
are identical, but because the different models use different growth rates, the actual 
targets differ substantially. Emissions grow slowest in PACE, so that emissions have to 
be cut by 23%. Emissions grow fastest in DART, so that emissions reduction is 33%. 
Gemini-E3 is in between, with a target of 26%. This compares to a 19% cut according to 
the impact assessment of the European Commission (Capros et al. 2008). 
Figure 1 also shows the EU-wide loss of welfare.5 This is two orders of magnitude 
smaller than the emissions abatement. The costs follow the same pattern as the targets. 
Costs are lowest in PACE (0.45%) and highest in DART (1.98%), with Gemini-E3 in 
                                                 
4 Note that the PACE model cannot run this scenario because of its crude regional aggregation. 
5 Hicksian Equivalent Variation in DART and PACE; Hicksian Compensating Variation in Gemini-E3 
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between (0.67%). The European Commission reports a cost of 0.50% (Capros et al. 
2008).6 When implemented at the lowest possible cost, climate policy is not expensive. 
Finally, Figure 1 shows the price of carbon dioxide emissions permits. Here the pattern is 
broken. PACE has the lowest price at €36/tCO2, but the price in Gemini-E3 (€72/tCO2) is 
slightly higher than in DART (€68/tCO2). This suggests that the implicit emissions 
reduction cost curve in Gemini-E3 is steeper than in the other two models. According to 
the European Commission, the price of carbon would be €49/tCO2 in 2020 (Capros et al. 
2008). 
We next turn to a single distortion in policy: The price of carbon differs between the ETS 
and the non-ETS emissions, but does not differ between Member States. 
Figure 2 shows ETS and non-ETS emissions separately. In PACE, ETS emissions have to 
be cut by 29% in the ETS and 18% in the non-ETS. In DART, ETS emissions have to be 
cut by 38% and non-ETS emissions by 26%. In Gemini-E3, the ETS reduction is 34% 
and non-ETS abatement 17%. This compares with a 26% cut in the ETS and a 12% cut 
outside the ETS according to the European Commission (Capros et al. 2008). In all three 
models as well as in the EU impact assessment, ETS emissions reduction is more 
stringent than non-ETS emissions reduction. All models assume that ETS emissions grow 
faster (in the absence of policy) than do non-ETS emissions. 
Figure 2 also shows the permit prices in the ETS and non-ETS. In Gemini-E3, the price is 
almost equal7 (and thus equal to the price in the first-best policy; cf. Figure 1). That is, 
the initial allocation of ETS and non-ETS abatement obligations is almost cost-effective; 
there are few opportunities for arbitrage. The other two models disagree. DART and 
PACE show a non-ETS price that is substantially higher than the ETS price even though 
the non-ETS target is less stringent. That is, DART and PACE have an implicit 
abatement cost function that is much steeper for non-ETS than for ETS emissions. 
Finally, Figure 2 shows the excess costs, that is, the welfare loss on top of the costs of the 
first-best policy as shown in Figure 1. This is 0.28% in DART and 0.24% in PACE. In 
                                                 
6 Note that this is given as “total energy system cost” as a fraction of Gross Domestic Product, which is an 
incomplete welfare measure; GDP is otherwise unspecified, but if scenario-specific GDP is used, the 
welfare measurement is inconsistent as well as incomplete. 
7 The price difference is 0.15 €/tCO2. 
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DART, the policy with two carbon prices is 14% more expensive than the policy with 
one price, while in PACE the cost increase is 53%. In Gemini-E3, the initial allocation 
between ETS and non-ETS is almost cost-effective, so the effect of separating the two 
markets is very small.8 
We next turn to the policy scenario with differentiated prices for the non-ETS. Only two 
of the three models could run this scenario. Figure 3 shows the 2020 permit price relative 
to the respective EU average. The models agree that prices would vary widely across the 
EU, the price in Germany would be close to the EU average, the price in the UK and 
France would be above average, and the price in Eastern Europe would be below average. 
For the Benelux, DART finds that the non-ETS prices are close to the EU average, but 
Gemini-E3 finds large differences; in Belgium, the price would be 359% above average. 
As the two models have different regionalizations, one cannot read too much from Figure 
3, but it is clear that the distribution of costs between the Member States is particularly 
uncertain. 
In Gemini-E3, the excess cost of differentiated non-ETS prices is 0.25% of welfare in 
2020, 39% higher than in the case of a single non-ETS price; in DART, the excess cost is 
0.34%, 15% higher than for a single non-ETS price. At the same time, in Gemini-E3, the 
coefficient of variation of the non-ETS carbon prices is 0.96, while in DART this is 0.52. 
Based on first principles, one would expect that greater price variation implies greater 
excess cost. Again, the explanation lies in the curvature of the implicit abatement cost 
curve. As noted above, the cost curve in Gemini-E3 is rather steep, so that marginal costs 
rapidly escalate while total costs rise much more slowly. 
Finally, we consider the effect of the renewable penetration standard in the scenario with 
a uniform price for all emissions, and in the scenario with ETS and non-ETS split into 
two markets. The renewables target in itself reduces carbon dioxide emissions. Climate 
policy would therefore need to be less stringent, and the price of carbon duly falls in all 
                                                 
8 In fact, the welfare impact is positive in the EU. The two scenarios cannot be compared. The first scenario 
was simulated with a uniform carbon tax on all emissions. The second scenario was simulated with a 
permit market for non-ETS emissions. At the global level, welfare falls if ETS and non-ETS are regulated 
with different prices (as one would expect). This result does not carry over to the EU because carbon taxes 
and permits have a different impact on the terms of trade. As a result, the two scenarios are incomparable, 
and the welfare gain found is meaningless. 
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three models. In the scenario with a single permit market for all emissions, the carbon 
price falls by 3% in Gemini-E3 and by 22% in DART. PACE is in between with a price 
drop of 13% (see Figure 4). That is, renewables play a greater role in climate policy in 
Gemini-E3, while DART instead seeks to reduce emissions by energy efficiency and 
switching from coal to gas. The European Commission finds a price drop of 19% (Capros 
et al. 2008). 
If the market is split between ETS and non-ETS, different results emerge. The 
renewables standard reduces the ETS price to a greater extent: by 33% in DART and by 
37% in PACE, but by only 1% in Gemini-E3. In DART and PACE, the non-ETS price 
rises by 5% and 4%, respectively; but it falls by 1% in Gemini-E3. In Gemini-E3, 
renewables are deployed in the non-ETS sector. The same result is found by the 
European Commission (Capros et al. 2008). In DART and PACE, the renewables 
standard hardly affects the non-ETS sectors. Therefore, in these models, the non-ETS 
permit price changes are the result of second-order effects. Particularly, the renewables 
standard drives down the price of fossil fuels; this needs to be compensated by a higher 
carbon price in the non-ETS sector. 
If the non-ETS market is also split by Member State, the ETS price rises by 33% in 
DART and by 1% in Gemini-E3.9 The non-ETS price rises by 3% and 5% in DART and 
Gemini-E3, respectively. 
Figure 5 shows the implications of the renewables standard. The renewables standard 
exerts a downward pressure on the carbon cap, thereby lowering carbon prices (cf. Figure 
4) and distorting the cost-effective contribution of emissions reduction from different 
channels (fuel switching, energy efficiency improvements, energy savings) from a first-
best perspective. For uniform emissions pricing, Gemini-E3 finds that the renewables 
constraint imposes a small cost (0.33%), whereas DART find that the lower bound on 
renewables induces a welfare loss of 1.35%. PACE reports a slight welfare increase 
(0.01%) because prior distortions on the energy markets call for a more favourable 
treatment of renewable energy. If the market is split between ETS and non-ETS, the 
welfare loss is greater – that is, the inefficiencies interact with one another. The excess 
                                                 
9 This scenario was not run by PACE. 
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costs go up by 0.64% in DART and by 0.23% in Gemini-E3, while PACE swings from a 
0.01% benefit to a 0.06% loss. If the non-ETS market is split between Member States, 
DART shows an excess cost of 1.90% of consumption and Gemini-E3 a smaller 0.42%. 
Overall, PACE finds that the inefficiencies in policy imply that welfare losses are 67% 
above those in the cost-effective implementation. DART finds excess costs of 127%. 
Gemini-E3 is in between with 98%. In contrast, the European Commission reports excess 
costs of only 3% (Capros et al. 2008). 
 
4. Other findings 
Using the Gemini-E3 model,(Bernard and Vielle) focus on the implications of climate 
policy for international trade. They decompose the welfare impact (Hicksian Equivalent 
Variation) into the terms of trade effect and a residual, which they refer to as the 
deadweight loss of taxation. The terms of trade effect is positive for Western European 
countries, alleviating the costs of emissions abatement. For Belgium and the Netherlands, 
the terms of trade gains are so large that the overall impact on welfare is positive. The 
USA and Japan also gain in terms of trade, but the eastern part of the European Union, 
the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the rest of the world (Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia) lose. 
Bernard and Vielle introduce a new way to define carbon leakage. Previously, carbon 
leakage was defined as the increase in greenhouse gas emissions in non-abating countries 
relative to the case without climate policy. Bernard and Vielle call this “gross carbon 
leakage”. They define “net carbon leakage” as the increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
in non-abating countries relative to the case with climate policy but without carbon 
leakage. Both gross and net leakage are defined against a counterfactual. Gross leakage 
confounds all general equilibrium effects of abatement in one group of countries on the 
rest of the world. Net leakage, on the other hand, is limited to substitution effects only, 
that is, the relocation of production from abating to non-abating countries. Net leakage 
thus seems to be the more appropriate definition. Bernard and Vielle show that gross 
leakage is more than twice as large as net leakage. 
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Finally, Bernard and Vielle analyze a policy that is close to the proposed EU directive. 
This includes limited CDM, but also restricted trade in non-ETS allowances. The trade 
restrictions bring a welfare loss, but this is more than offset by cheap (€14/tCO2) 
emissions reductions outside the EU. The net welfare gain is 0.06%. The CDM offsets 
would be primarily used in the non-ETS sectors, and the average price falls from 
€155/tCO2 to €74/tCO2, very close to the ETS price of €71/tCO2. 
Using the DART model, (Kretschmer et al.) focus on biofuels. Besides its targets for 
greenhouse gas emissions and the share of renewables in overall energy supply, the 
European Union also aims for a 10% market share of biofuels in transport by 2020. The 
analysis indicates that the biofuels target is binding. Neither the emissions target nor the 
overall renewables target would induce the required uptake of biofuels in transport. There 
are cheaper options to reduce emissions, and there are cheaper ways to use renewable 
energy. As a result, one would expect that imposing the biofuels target implies a loss in 
welfare. This is true in the scenario in which the biofuels target is imposed on each 
Member State, but not if the biofuels target is EU-wide. This counterintuitive result is 
explained by the fact that DART is a general equilibrium model with many distortions in 
the base case. Specifically, biofuels crowd out food production. Indeed, DART reports a 
substantial increase in food prices. Because EU food production is both subsidized and 
shielded from the world market, a forced reduction of agricultural production is a benefit. 
This benefit is larger, according to DART, than the welfare loss induced by the biofuels 
target. 
Using the PACE model, (Böhringer et al.) focus on the impact of alternative baseline 
scenarios on the macroeconomic costs of EU climate policy. The baseline projections not 
only determine the magnitude of the effective abatement requirement but also the ease of 
emissions abatement. The critical importance of baseline projections for the magnitude of 
the costs of complying with emissions reduction targets is widely ignored in the policy 
debate. Böhringer et al. show that alternative baseline variants explain drastic differences 
in compliance cost – in their case by a factor 4 to 6. They also show that the excess cost 
of deviating from uniform pricing depends on the baseline scenario. Böhringer et al. 
argue that uniform emissions pricing may not be the preferred policy in the presence of 
initial tax distortions and international market power. They show that deviation from 
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uniform emissions pricing across ETS and non-ETS sectors can be welfare-improving as 
long as the increase in direct abatement costs due to differential emissions pricing is more 
than offset through potential terms-of-trade gains or the amelioration of initial tax 
distortions. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we present simulation results from three computable general equilibrium 
models on the economic implications of EU climate policies. Obviously, these models 
and our stylized policy scenarios cannot possibly reflect the true complexity of climate 
and energy policy in the European Union. However, they do provide important insights 
into key determinants of climate policy costs, and serve as a post-hoc check on policy 
choices and the impact assessment of the European Commission. 
The following results emerge. If implemented at the lowest possible cost, the 20% 
emissions reduction for 2020 would lead to a welfare loss of 0.5-2.0%. The policy period 
is 2013-2020, so the pessimistic estimate suggests a loss of one year of growth in eight. It 
should be noted that these are results from comparative-static computable general 
equilibrium models. That is, transitional frictions are disregarded, and the effect of 
emissions reduction policy on economic growth is not treated thoroughly if at all. 
The second result is that second-best policies increase costs. A policy with two carbon 
prices (one for the ETS, one for the non-ETS) rather than one could increase costs by 
50%. A policy with 28 carbon prices (one for the ETS, one each for each Member State), 
could increase costs by another 40%. The renewables standard could raise the costs of 
emissions reduction by 90%. Overall, the inefficiencies in policy lead to a cost that is 
100-125% too high. 
The third result is that the models differ greatly in the detail of their results. The previous 
paragraph cites the most pessimistic findings. However, we also find that, according to 
some model results, the ETS/non-ETS split may have a negligible impact on welfare, and 
that the renewables standard may even improve welfare. Splitting the non-ETS target of 
the EU into targets for each Member State is costly in both models that considered this. 
However, while the models disagree whether it is the renewables target or the ETS/non-
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ETS split that causes excess costs, the models agree that the two together imply a 
substantial and unnecessary welfare loss. 
Comparing the above results to those of the impact assessment of the European 
Commission (Capros et al. 2008), we find that the marginal, total and excess costs 
reported here are higher. In some cases, the numbers of the European Commission are in 
the lower end of the range found here; in other cases, the European Commission’s are 
below the lowest numbers found here. This suggests that there would be scope for closer 
scrutiny of the European Commission’s impact assessments. 
The above results should be treated with caution. The numbers are neither accurate nor 
precise. They are ballpark estimates. What really matters are the insights: Climate policy 
need not cost a lot, but imperfect implementation implies excess costs. The excess costs 
are substantial relative to the costs of the first-best policy, but modest in absolute terms. 
There is scope for further research. We review the results of three computable general 
equilibrium models, which are good for certain types of analyses. One aspect that 
deserves further attention is the interactions between climate policy and pre-existing tax 
and trade distortions, and the interactions between climate policy and market power. 
First-best policy such as a uniform carbon tax may well be suboptimal, but the size of the 
welfare loss is not clear at present, nor is it known how policies should deviate from the 
first-best prescription. Furthermore, policy makers occasionally use second-best 
arguments to deviate from first-best prescriptions, but in a haphazard way. The welfare 
loss of using the wrong second-best policy has yet to be estimated. Another open 
question concerns the split between ETS and non-ETS emissions. The models used here 
and elsewhere make this distinction on a sectoral basis but the actual distinction is based 
on the size of the installation. This means that, in reality, small and large companies in 
the same sector are regulated differently. Typically, tax differentiation within a sector 
(that is, between companies that compete on input and output markets) is worse than tax 
differentiation between sectors (that is, between companies that compete on input 
markets only). 
Other types of economics models are needed to analyze other policy questions. The year 
2020 is sufficiently close that the business cycle matters. The same is true for vintages of 
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capital and durable consumption goods. In a short policy period such as 2013-2020, the 
construction period of infrastructure would have an impact too. In the long run, the 
economic impact of climate policy is driven by its effects on the growth rate of the 
economy, while the environmental impact is driven by its effects on the rate and direction 
of technological progress (Baker et al. 2006;Clarke et al. 2008;Gillingham et al. 
2008;Pizer and Popp 2008). None of these issues is well understood. The current papers 
do not shed much light on them either, so we defer them to future research. 
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Figure 1. The 2020 emissions reduction target (from the baseline scenario) for ETS plus 
non-ETS emissions, the price of carbon dioxide emissions permits (right axis), and the 
loss of welfare (from the baseline scenario) according to the three different models. 
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Figure 2. The 2020 emissions reduction target (from the baseline scenario) for ETS and 
non-ETS emissions, the price of ETS and non-ETS carbon dioxide emissions permits 
(right axis), and the excess loss of consumption (from the first best scenario) according to 
the three different models. 
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Figure 3. The 2020 price of non-ETS emissions permits in the countries and regions of 
the European Union according to two different models; for reference, the ETS price is 
shown too. 
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Figure 4. The 2020 price emissions permits in the European Union according to three 
different models; no = no target for the share of renewables in energy supply; yes = target 
for the share of renewables in energy supply; 1 = uniform price for ETS and non-ETS 
emissions; 2 = separate prices for ETS and non-ETS emissions; N+1 one Europe-wide 
price for ETS emissions, different prices for non-ETS emissions in different Member 
States; ETS = ETS price; nETS = non-ETS price. 
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Figure 5. The change in welfare in the European Union in 2020 according to three 
different models; no = no target for the share of renewables in energy supply; yes = target 
for the share of renewables in energy supply; 1 = uniform price for ETS and non-ETS 
emissions; 2 = separate prices for ETS and non-ETS emissions; N+1 = one Europe-wide 
price for ETS emissions, different prices for non-ETS emissions in different Member 
States. 
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